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1 PRIVATE LAW
question whether the apparently mandatory provisions of Ar-
ticle 926 of the Civil Code can thus be waived, the question still
remains whether, had he refused, the vendee could have been
compelled, in a suit for specific performance, to accept the title
tendered to him by his vendor.3 9
In Succession of Quartarro4 ° the court, for the first time,
interpreted the 1948 amendment of Article 1705 of the Civil
Code as meaning that a testament falls by the subsequent adop-
tion of a person by the testator, whether the person adopted is
a minor or a major. The court clearly explained that the person
adopted acquires the status of an heir, no matter what his age
might be, and thus dismissed as unsound the argument advanced
that by the use of the word "child" in the amendment, the legis-
lature intended to limit the article to the adoption of minors.
And in Daigle v. Fournet4 ' the court applied Article 1740 of
the Civil Code and permitted the plaintiff to recover his engage-
ment ring from the defendant when the latter broke off their
engagement to be married. This was but a clear application of
the rule expressed in the article that a donation made in con-
templation of marriage is void if the contemplated marriage
does not take place.
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
GENERAL
If a person conditions the assumption of an obligation on a
subsequent exercise of his will, he does not actually obligate him-
self. Article 2034 of the Civil Code recognizes this fact by stat-
ing that such an obligation is null. The potestative condition to
to plaintiff's original and amended petitions the special defense of estoppel. This
defense is predicated upon plaintiff's execution of an affidavit wherein he at-
tested to the status of Clarence Huckaby as an acknowledged natural child which
affidavit was made a part of the succession proceedings and made a basis of
judgment in those proceedings. This judgment of possession constituted the basis
of the subsequent sale of the property to Tony Greco, co-defendant herein. Plain-
tiff, therefore, in effect was a party to the proceeding of which he now attacks.
These factual circumstances present a clear case of sustaining the plea of
estoppel." Id. at 74.
39. Cf. Wimberly v. King, 179 So. 515 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938).
40. 139 So. 2d 277 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 1962.
41. 141 So. 2d 406 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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which this article applies is not one which subjects the perform-
ance of'an obligation to the will of the obligor, but'simply one
which makes the very assumption of an obligation subject to a
later exercise of his will.'
In Henry v. Scott 2 an automobile dealer accepted two vehicles
from the plaintiff and gave the latter a credit memorandum
covering each of them to be used toward the subsequent pur-
chase of a new car and truck. Before any further action was
taken, the defendant went out of the automobile business. There-
after plaintiff filed suit seeking to recover the proceeds derived
by defendant from the sale of the vehicles and claimed that de-
fendant had rendered himself unable to comply by discontinuing
the automobile business. For his part, the defendant seems to
have insisted on his continued readiness to perform. The court
found that there was no meeting of the minds on the ground
that the memoranda did not specify any particular vehicles to
be purchased or contain any mention of the prices to be paid for
them or provide any method by which prices could be fixed.
This lack of certainty under the facts of the case was, perhaps,
a sufficient basis for holding the agreement unenforceable. But
the opinion also expressed the view that since one or both of the
parties by refusing to agree on a price for the new vehicles could
defeat the agreement, both memoranda "contained a potestative
condition" and were therefore nudum pactum. It is more or less
common practice to refer to an unenforceable agreement as
nudum pactum or as containing a potestative condition. Orig-
inally a nude pact was a pact not included within the four recog-
nized consensual contracts and not clothed with the necessary
formalities or supported by a performance rendered. 4 More
modernly the' term has come to be used to express absence of
consideration. As hereinabove indicated, a nullifying potesta-
tive condition is a condition that subjects the assumption of an
obligation to a further simple exercise of will by the party who
purports to assume it. In the present case the assumption of an
1. 4 AUBBY ET RAU, DaOIT CIVIL FRANCAIS n. 24 (6th ed. 1946). If one says,
"I will buy if I wish to," he does not then assume an obligation. If he says, "I
will buy'if I 'move to Paris," he does assume an obligation notwithstanding that
'its performance 'depends upon his will. Of. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2035 (1870),
which makes the same distinction.
2. 136 So. 2d '101' (La. App..3d Cir. 1962).
3. See Martin v2 Dutton Motors, Inc., 206 La. 154, 19 So. 2d 32 (1944)', on
which the court relied in the instant case.
4. 3 TouLL=R, DROIT CIvn'.FRANcArS, tit. III, n. 13 (6th ed 1846)'.
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obligation by neither party was in form subjected to a purely
potestative condition. Although neither may have been bound
to agree on a price for the new vehicles, it would appear better
to say in cases of this kind that the agreement is simply too in-
definite to be enforceable. To use potestative condition termi-
nology to cover indefiniteness is to invite further confusion in
this area. The seller made a positive promise supported by the
delivery to him of two vehicles to give the buyer the stated
credit on the purchase of new vehicles and the buyer may be
considered, at least by implication, as having promised as posi-
tively to buy them. If, in a case of this kind, the purchaser
should demand delivery of certain new vehicles at their ordinary
retail price, it would be entirely possible as well as permissible
to enforce the agreement against the seller. Consequently, it is
not accurate to suggest that the seller made no promise at all,
which is the case when a promise is subjected to a purely po-
testative condition. The modern tendency is toward more liber-
ality in enforcing agreements wherein the parties have left gaps
to be later filled, and this seems desirable. 5
The instructive opinion of the Supreme Court in Long v.
Foster & Associates, Inc.," wherein the provisions of the Civil
Code dealing with potestative conditions and prior jurisprudence
on the subject are examined with care, has been noted in another
issue of this Review.7
It is established in the jurisprudence that a refusal or
acknowledged inability to perform dispenses with the necessity
for a formal putting in default. This view was followed in
Elliott v. Dupuy,8 wherein the court held that a statement by
the secretary of the seller's attorney over the telephone to the
buyer's attorney, to the effect that the former could not appear
at a stated time for the purpose of transferring the property
covered by a contract to sell, amounted to a refusal to perform.
Granting that the Civil Code requires a putting in default for
the recovery of damages for nonperformance as well as for delay
in performance, it seems doubtful that such a telephone conver-
5. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2470 (1870). Of. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 2-305. In the comment it is said, "This Article rejects in these instances the
formula that 'An agreement to agree is unenforceable' if the case falls within
subsection (1) of this section, and rejects also defeating such agreements on the
ground of 'indefiniteness.' "
6.2242 Lai 295, 136.So.2d 48 (1961).
7. 22 LA. L. REV. 872 (1962).
8. 242 La. 173, 135 So. 2d 54 (1961).
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sation should be held sufficient to satisfy the minimum require-
ment of an oral demand made in the presence of two witnesses.
In addition, a statement by a party that he cannot appear at a
certain time to perform an act is not a statement that he will not
perform it, but is, at most, a statement that he will not perform
it at that time. If such a statement by a client's attorney should
properly be considered sufficient to initiate the running of delay
damages against the client, it is nevertheless doubtful that it
should be counted as legally sufficient to support an award of
damages designed to compensate for nonperformance. How-
ever, if the seller had offered to perform in response to the suit,
it appears that the court would have had the power to grant
additional time,9 and since he did not do so, judgment declaring
a forfeiture of the earnest money was in order.
The court's approval in Wimbush v. Jones'0 of the admissi-
bility of parol evidence to show that a price of $800 was paid
for certain property, instead of the recited $250, by way of de-
fense to a claim of lesion beyond moiety is difficult to reconcile
with earlier cases" or with the French treatment of the prob-
lem.' 2 While it is true that Article 1900 of the Civil Code per-
mits the use of extrinsic evidence to sustain a contract where
the cause expressed in the contract does not exist, generally
speaking the jurisprudence has restricted the application of this
principle to cases where the stated cause or consideration has
been disproved by legally admissible evidence, e.g., when a third
party attacks an act as a simulation. Such a case was Love v.
Dedon,3 which was cited in support of the court's opinion. Cases
of the latter kind frequently contain statements to the effect
that parol evidence is admissible to sustain a contract, although
not to destroy it. Applied to a case where the stated cause has
been properly disproved and the parties then seek to show the
true cause, the statement is correct, but the propriety of the
application of the rule to the facts before the court in the instant
case seems questionable. It well may be, however, that the basic
rule is too stringent.
SALES
Most of the cases decided during this period which presented
problems in the law of sales involved questions of redhibition.
9. LA. CIviL CODF art. 2047 (1870).
10. 136 So. 2d 704 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
11. See Brewer v. New Orleans Land Co., 154 La. 446, 97 So. 605 (1923).
12. See Comment, 3 LA. L. REv. 427 (1941).
13. 239 La. 109, 118 So. 2d 122 (1960).
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Such a case was Hermeling v. Whitmore,'14 where the thing
sold was a house. The claims of the plaintiff plus calls in war-
ranty went back to the seller of the lot in question. Some of the
issues in the case were disposed of on the basis of prescription.
Of interest was the court's holding that where the seller is the
builder and undertakes, subsequently to the sale, to make needed
repairs, prescription does not begin to run again until the buyer
rediscovers that the defects have not been remedied. This is a
sound reflection of the rule that the prescriptive period runs
from the date of discovery rather than the sale where the seller
is chargeable with knowledge of the vice. Although this and
earlier cases do not make it clear whether attempts by a seller
to make needed repairs will constitute an interruption rather
than a suspension of prescription, the former appears to be the
sense of the jurisprudence. Where a seller does undertake to
repair the thing sold, the buyer who would rely on this action
for the purpose of overcoming a plea of prescription carries the
burden of showing that the repairs made by the seller were occa-
sioned by the defect on which he relies to support his claim in
redhibition. In Delahoussaye v. Domingues Chevrolet, Inc.,1 5 the
buyer failed to do this.
Cases involving termite damage have been consistent in
treating the presence of termites as a redhibitory defect. The
same view is held in France.16 In Fitzmorris v. Kelly,17 the court
took the justifiable view that the purchaser of a fifty-year old
building, the walls of which were observably out of plumb and
which contained slanting and unsteady floors, was so put on
notice of the questionable condition of the building as to be pre-
cluded from claiming relief for termite damage within the walls
notwithstanding that the damage was not discoverable on simple
inspection. This disposition of the case seems to be consistent
with the basic theory that a purchaser who knowingly assumes
the risk of defects in the thing he buys is in no position to claim
that his consent was given in error.
In Fink v. Bihmi8 the court treated an action by a buyer of
an immovable to recover from the seller a portion of the pur-
chase price which covered a paving lien, subsequently refunded
14. 140 So. 2d 257 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
15. 137 So. 2d 356 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
16. See 11 BEUDANT, COURS DEDROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 257 (1938).
17. 139 So. 2d 12 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
18. 137 So. 2d 122 (La. App. 4th Cir, 1962),..
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to the seller by the parish following a revocation of the lien, as
an action in redhibition or quanti minoris which had prescribed
one year from the date of the sale. Accepting the basic sound-
ness of the plaintiff's claim, the decision seems questionable. In
the first place, the action was brought well within a year from
the date the refund was made, and, in the second, the existence
of a lien does not appear to constitute a redhibitory defect which
would give rise to an action in redhibition or for a reduction of
the price but rather a charge against the property affecting title
or ownership. A proper basis for permitting recovery might
well have been quasi-contract. 19
The effect of the buyer's viewing the property before the
sale on the question of whether the sale should be counted as per
aversionem was considered by the court in Scurria v. Russo."
Prior cases wherein this fact was, on the one hand, disregarded,
and on the other, counted as controlling, are not easily reconcil-
able. The justification for allowing neither an increase nor a
diminution of the price where the property is described by the
adjoining tenements and sold from boundary to boundary lies
in the conclusion that in such a case the buyer is not attaching
importance to whatever mention of quantity may be contained
in the act. If the property sold is, say, a lot in a subdivision, a
conclusion that the recited measurements meant nothing to the
purchaser, that he turned his face away from them (per aversio-
nem) merely because he could see the limits of the lot by a fence
or hedge line or the way the grass was cut, is surely debatable.
The Civil Code is rather specific in indicating what sales are
to be treated as per aversionem and the advisability of adopting
an additional and unvoiced factor is not clear. However, the
decision in the instant case resolved the issue in favor of the
buyer.
LEASE
The Civil Code provides for the continuation of leases of im-
movables on an indefinite basis where the tenant holds over for
a stated period after the expiration of the stipulated term. How-
ever, the Code makes no mention of the principle of tacit recon-
duction with respect to leases of movables.
In Southern Fleet Leasing Corp. v. Airline Builders Service,
19. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2301, 2302, 2304 (1870).
20. 134 So. 2d 679 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
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Inc.,21 it was held that the sureties on a lease of motor vehicles
were discharged by the continuation of the lease on a month-to-
month basis after the initial period of one year had expired. The
prolongation of the lease was provided for by the contract itself
but on the basis of two similar cases involving immovables the
court counted this fact as unimportant. This jurisprudence is
consistent with Article 2690 of the Code and the basic principle
that a contract of suretyship is strictissimi juris. No reason ap-
pears for drawing a distinction between leases of immovables
and leases of movables.
In Frug6. v. Muffoletto,22 the Supreme Court, answering a
question certified by the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, held
that where a tenant makes repairs and improvements to the
leased premises in keeping with authority granted by the lease
but at his own expense, laborers and furnishers of materials do
not have a privilege on the structure under R.S. 9:4801-17, but
their sole privilege is against the leasehold rights of the lessee
under R.S. 9:4811. Support for this conclusion was found also
in Article 3249 of the Civil Code.
TORTS
David W. Robertson*
INTERVENING NEGLIGENCE-PROXIMATE CAUSE
It would perhaps not be too grotesque an oversimplification
of the theory of tort liability to state that when defendant has
been guilty of a breach of a duty owed plaintiff, and that breach
has in fact caused some harm to plaintiff, then defendant will
be liable for the resultant loss. This statement's consistency
with fact may be preserved in all cases-even the most excep-
tional - by manipulation within the meaning of the term duty.
Thus, cases where defendant has been guilty of wrongdoing
causing plaintiff harm which the law deems unredressable can
be handled by stating that defendant owed no duty to plaintiff.
More often, however, such situations will be handled by the
courts in terms of proximate causation. It will be stated that
while defendant has been a wrongdoer and plaintiff has suf-
2i. 136 So.2d 458 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
22. 137 So. 2d 333 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
*Instructor in Law, Louisiana State University.
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